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ABSTRACT: This short piece explores what cultural theory should learn from the 
experience of the global pandemic. It argues that the main lesson should not be about how the 
crisis of the pandemic has been interpreted culturally, but about the deep social and economic 
inequalities which were foregrounded through the experience of ‘getting by’ in the pandemic, 
which positioned people in very different ways. So dramatic have been those inequalities, 
that any inherited notion of culture as something shared need to be definitively abandoned. 
This had already been anticipated in Ulf Hannerz’s deconstruction of holistic notions of 
culture three decades ago, but it needs now to be acted on, as we seek to confront honestly the 
growing inequalities which make the normal order of everyday life possible.  
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Three decades ago, there was a brief fashion for analyzing culture as if it were a form of 
contagion. The idea was that the dissemination of cultural materials in space could be better 
explained using the models of epidemiology and other natural sciences than by, say, 
hermeneutics (Sperber, 1996). A popular culture variant of this approach was called 
‘connectionism’ (Plant, 1996; de Landa, 1994).1 Neither approach caught on – 
unsurprisingly, because culture always involves not just transmission but interpretation. But 
now that we have been living through a genuine pandemic rather than a fevered moment of 
theoretical speculation, it seems reasonable to ask: what have we learned about ‘culture’ 
during the Covid-19 pandemic?  
 
For many, the global Covid-19 pandemic has been the most disruptive event in their lifetime. 
It is not so much a world event, as an event-world, which has for many changed the rules of 
how their routine worlds operate and interconnect with the worlds of others. It has unsettled 
the bundles of routine actions from which lives were made. The future, no longer a secure 
domain towards which we can plan, has become hard to think about. We exist in a state of 
‘horizonlessness’ (Couldry and Schneier 2020). Admittedly, hyperbole about the pandemic 
experience means little if, as for the world’s ever-increasing millions of forced migrants, your 
normal life consists of continual disruption, instability, an impossibility to plan. But the sense 
of a universal disruption is shared widely enough for it to be worth reflecting upon.  
 
So how should we think about the global pandemic, and its meaning? We are tempted,  
inexorably, to interpret the pandemic, or, rather, being critical analysts of communication, to 
deconstruct how the global pandemic has been interpreted by ourselves and others. But what 
if that is not the most helpful response? What if how the pandemic has been interpreted 
matters less than how it has been ‘lived’, that is, organized as a differentiated hierarchy of 
linked practices? Yes, everyone has been struggling to make sense of what is going on during 
this unprecedented and intensely mediated disruption. But what if our practices of making 
sense matter much less than our intensely differentiated patterns of making do - of getting by 
- in reliance on the practices and commitments of others? What if the main lesson for critical 
thinking from the pandemic turns out to be not what a global crisis means, but how a global 
crisis orders – re-orders – the matrix of segregated practices we call ‘living together’? What 
if the global pandemic has confronted us, in brute reality, with what, as critical analysts, we 
thought we already knew theoretically: that cultures are not ‘wholes’, that ‘publics’ are 
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inherently divided (Ananny 2021), that democracies are orchestrated conflict, not consensus, 
and that social order means the strategic management of inequality? 
 
It might seem I am contradicting myself. I began by insisting that epidemiological theories of 
culture fail because they ignore interpretation, but then argued that it is insufficient to 
foreground questions of how the pandemic was interpreted. But there is no contradiction. 
Interpretations often matter, and varieties of interpretation matter a lot, because they 
complicate holistic ideas of culture that we inherited from traditional anthropology and 
sociology (Couldry 2000: chapter 5). It makes no sense therefore to analyze culture as if it 
was just a mass of organisms that replicate (or don’t). But it does not follow that our 
interpretations of culture are always more important than how our actions ‘inside’ culture are 
organized, and how resources are distributed to make such actions possible. When a major 
world crisis, such as a pandemic or other environmental disaster, deranges normal routines 
and resource distributions, then it makes sense to look first into that transformation before we 
turn to questions of cultural interpretation. Indeed, looking at practice may tell us more than 
we expect about culture itself. That is the instinct I will pursue in this short essay.  
 
The hidden violence of ‘getting by’ 
 
Almost everyone found their everyday lives adjusted by the pandemic: by the cessation of 
many work, travel, social and consumption routines, by sheer fear and uncertainty. In what 
follows, I will not presume to speak of the experience of those who caught Covid-19, 
especially in its more serious or long-term forms, or who lost close loved ones to the disease: 
I will focus on the adjustments to ordinary routine that the pandemic forced, grief and major 
illness never being routine. 
 
People were positioned very differently in terms of their abilities to sustain the costs of such 
life adjustments. Lockdown meant something fundamentally different, depending on whether 
you lived alone or with others you loved, in a small room or a house with a garden, in a 
crowded noisy city or spaced-out in the countryside. Factors which, in normal times, would 
compensate, in part, for such basic differences were suspended, collapsing any pretence that 
what ‘we’ were experiencing as the pandemic was the same thing, even as the rhetoric of 
‘being in this together’ intensified.  
 
When people did live together, the mutual costs of their adjustments were distributed 
unevenly, not least the cost of maintaining largely unchanged one’s work profile and 
presence, but under radically different conditions across digital platforms. Women bore most 
of the costs of increased childcare and educational responsibility, among other practical tasks, 
while still needing to maintain their jobs. Households were very differently positioned in 
whether they could pass on to others the costs of adjusting to movement restrictions. Those 
whose jobs remained secure in the pandemic passed on costs to those whose jobs 
disappeared; those whose jobs could be performed adequately online passed on costs to those 
whose work required physical presence and face-to-face interaction. These fundamental 
inequalities in labor markets and the division of labour reinforced basic inequalities in living 
conditions (housing, reliance on or independence from public transport).  
 
One’s chance of ‘getting by’ was intensely shaped by enduring inequalities of class, gender 
and race. In the USA which was already undergoing an intense and separate crisis of racial 
conflict, the racial parameters of the Covid-19 life-chances lottery (and in parallel the 
growing environmental crisis) were stark: as Mike Ananny put it recently, ‘many saw for the 
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first times how the seeming stability of American public life depends upon layers of racism’ 
(Ananny 2021, n.p.). In Britain, similar tensions were felt, but in the cultural responses that 
compensated for them, class difference prevailed. In my own, mainly privileged village, a 
small army of stuffed models of ‘heroes’ appeared for a few winter weeks in the center of the 
village, representing core service workers, almost all white.  
 
In short, what the pandemic foregrounded and accentuated were the normal inequalities on 
which a sense of ‘normal life’ had always relied: what we might call the hidden violence of 
‘getting by’. Critical theory has recognized this violence theoretically for decades. Consider, 
for example, geographer Doreen Massey’s insistence, in response to David Harvey’s reading 
of postmodernity, on the ‘power-geometry of time-space compression’ which, beneath our 
accounts of universal change, drives profound inequalities in mobility and in power over 
what moves and flows (Massey 1994: 149). Meanwhile, the whole direction of cultural 
theory over the past 50 years has foregrounded the tensions disguised within universal 
accounts of culture, most notably the universalizing discourse which both sustains and 
disguises the privileges of ‘whiteness’ (Frankenberg 1993; Gilroy 1987).  
 
The pandemic added new dimensions to such everyday violence. When the governments of 
rich nations, such as the UK, did what (in general terms) one hopes any responsible 
government would do – protect the public health of that nation - they did so in ways that 
exploited huge inequalities of fiscal resource (to buy vaccines and influence their 
production), resulting in massive inequalities in vaccine rollout that have public health 
implications for the whole world. But on a global scale, the violence of ‘getting by’ cannot be 
hidden: it was controversial from early on, challenged for example by the World Health 
Organization which signalled the dangers of the Global North’s unwillingness to share its 
vaccine stores with poorer countries.  
 
My point is not that the (hidden or not so hidden) violence of getting by is new or surprising, 
only that it took a major disruption of everyday life for it to start being registered in daily 
discussion even if still inadequately, and only because even greater reliance on such 
inequalities was suddenly necessary. Meanwhile, other more comforting, but in many ways 
misleading, languages of social integration and solidarity overlaid our awareness of that 
hidden violence.  
 
What are the implications of this for our understanding of culture? 
 
The Hollowness of Cultural Theory 
 
It was already three decades ago that the Swedish anthropologist Ulf Hannerz thoroughly 
deconstructed any holistic theory of culture. He did this by close attention to how meaning 
actually flows in society (rather than through some fantastical epidemiology of culture). In 
his book Cultural Complexity, Hannerz (1992) argued that, because meanings require 
interpretation in order to pass between people and because interpretation is open-ended 
except under extreme conditions, there is no way of knowing in advance what interpretations 
of a common term, such as government or public health, have circulated where in space. 
Convergent interpretations, from this perspective, are not the expectation, but something that 
calls for specific explanation. Certainly, institutions exist in society which strive to impose 
common interpretations (Hannerz calls these ‘forms of externalization’: 1992: 7), but they are 




Hannerz goes further, drawing on his earlier work on the anthropology of cities (1980). 
Whatever the cultural narratives associated with them, cities are places not of unity, but 
organised diversity. At the end of Exploring the City, Hannerz insists that the cityscape 
should be studied not as a unity, but for ‘how it facilitates some contacts and obstructs 
others’ (1980: 305-306, my emphasis). A few years later, Hannerz made a similar point about 
the supposed unities of globalization. There is a global culture, he remarked, but it ‘is marked 
by an organization of diversity rather than by a replication of uniformity’ (1990: 237). In 
broad terms, such insights have been familiar from geography over decades, but it is 
Hannerz’s next formulation that is the most telling. Reflecting on the diversities of taste, 
education, income, occupation and knowledge that are basic features of social life, he 
comments that ‘contemporary complex societies systematically build non-sharing into their 
cultures’ (1992: 44).  
 
Hannerz’s emphasis on ‘the importance of non-sharing’ within culture is already radical, as a 
challenge to the holism of cultural theory, but even more important is that word ‘build’. If 
cultures are ‘built’ through non-sharing, how did we ever come to think of them holistically? 
How can narratives of culture which emphasise sharing over non-sharing ever do more than 
indirectly reflect underlying inequalities of power, which do so much to shape such non-
sharing?   
 
There are of course, in every society, powerful forces which benefit from dominant narratives 
of culture, especially those narratives which emphasise what is shared rather than not shared. 
Liberal theories of culture and politics rely on the assumption of an underlying sharing of 
values which underpin the surface diversities which markets exist to stimulate. Much more 
critically, Raymond Williams’ work (1958) reads as a brilliant attempt, from a marginal 
position in Britain’s divided culture, to salvage a new vision of a possible ‘common culture’ 
that respected an emerging working class ‘community of experience’ that had been 
disrespected for so long. Williams’ materialism did not allow him to trust in any simple 
reading of ‘culture as a whole way of life’, but the legacy of his engagement with that notion 
persists in our own failure to this day to definitively reject it, in spite of Hannerz’s subsequent 
demolition work.  
 
The result is a theoretical quandary which we must address under the circumstances of the 
pandemic. Indeed, not just the pandemic, but the other fundamental crises that are being lived 
simultaneously in many societies: the crisis over male violence against women, the crisis of 
white violence against other ethnicities, the rebirth of violent populist rhetorics that rely 
precisely on promoting a ‘culture’ that erects violent boundaries in cultural and social space 
to salvage an imaginary zone of commonality and sameness. These overlapping crises raise 
the stakes of repairing cultural theory.  
 
Consider an example of very smart cultural theory from a different era. Anthropologist 
Richard Wilk, like Hannerz, complicated loose understandings of globalization as 
homogenizing and instead suggested that it is characterized by ‘structures of common 
difference’: ‘we are not all becoming the same, but we are portraying, dramatizing, and 
communicating our differences to each other in ways that are more widely intelligible [ie to 
each other]’ (Wilk 1995: 142, emphasis and clarification added). But are we any more? Yes, 
we can recognize globalization in terms of the expanded frames of reference that help make 
some cultural differences commensurable to each other. But does this help us understand the 
lack today of a ready social language for talking about the deep inequalities that made the 
pandemic so different for different people; or for addressing the deep problems of 
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commensurability between rival cultural discourses over gender and race. The weakness at 
the heart of cultural theory, already suggested by Hannerz, is that it fails to address what we 
generally do not, and cannot, talk to each other about: a failure that is the price of the 





When I think about ‘culture’ today, this is the seeming break-point that I reach. Thinking 
comes to a stop when, equipped with only our inherited range of cultural theory, something 
as large, conflicted and at some level predictable as the global pandemic needs to be 
understood. Am I saying that, just as everyday life reached an impasse at points during the 
pandemic, cultural theory has too – the type of impasse that the late Lauren Berlant (2011: 4) 
described as ‘a stretch of time in which one moves around with a sense that the world is at 
once intensely present and enigmatic’? Perhaps. 
 
But we have known the impasse of cultural theory for a long time. Decades ago, James 
Clifford wrote that ‘culture is a deeply compromised term that I cannot yet do without’ 
(Clifford 1988: 10). Maybe societal conflicts have reached such a point that we must do 
without this term, or at least fundamentally reinterpret it: understanding culture not as 
something held in common, but as more or less localized structures of managed inequality, 
that is, at root, structures of force that are managed in part through the sharing, and often non-
sharing, of meaning. From this perspective, Williams’ work on common culture,  which has 
resonated with me personally for so long, cannot any longer guide us, except as a reminder of 
what we cannot have, until we achieve societies and a world that are fundamentally more 
equal.  
 
Post-Covid but while, very probably, the other crises of gender, race and populism remain 
unresolved, the work of cultural theory is not, I suggest, to theorize about something we call 
‘culture’. Its work instead lies in asking three questions. What are the conditions for a more 
direct and honest confrontation with the often-silenced inequalities that shape our lives 
‘together’?  And how can we construct a shared path towards reversing those inequalities - 
not in theory, but in practice? And, finally, what is the role of the meanings we do circulate, 
share, or challenge within that different practice? Making progress towards answering those 
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1 As an example, Sadie Plant wrote that ‘cultures are parallel distributed processes . . . There is no 
privileged scale: global and molecular cultures act through the middle ground of states, societies, 
members and things. There is nothing exclusively human about it: cultures emerge from the complex 
interactions of media, organisms, weather patterns, ecosystems . . . and bacterial exchanges’ (1996: 
214).   
